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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 940614-CA 
THOMAS M. VIGIL, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from three convictions of theft by deception, one a third degree 
felony and the others second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 
(1995), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it refused to ask potential jurors 
two of defendant's proposed voir dire questions? 
"The manner and method of voir dire lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court." State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. James. 819 
P.2d 781, 797 (Utah 1991)). 
2. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it refused to conduct additional 
voir dire of two potential jurors who indicated that had been exposed to media accounts of 
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failed adoptions where those jurors indicated they could not remember the details of the stories 
they had seen and would not be influenced by that media exposure? 
The standard of review for this issue is that same as articulate above for issue 1. 
3. Did the trial court properly determine and instruct the jury that theft by deception 
can occur in the context of an adoption proceeding? 
In this context, the trial court's decision to give a particular jury instruction constitutes 
a question of law that is reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. State v. Ontiveros. 835 
P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992). 
4. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it excluded the testimony of a 
defense witness based on its determination that the proffered testimony of that witness was 
irrelevant under rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, or alternatively, that it was inadmissible 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence? 
A trial court's determination of admissibility of evidence under rules 402 and 403 will 
be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion. State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
5. Did the trial court properly refuse to instruct the jury on rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the 
Utah Code of Professional Conduct where the propriety of the attorneys' performance was not 
an issue the jury needed to resolve? 
A trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). 
6. Did trial counsel's alleged error in failing to request a jury instruction about the 
possible defenses to theft that have been codified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(3) (1995) 
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constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, and did the trial court commit plain error in failing 
to give such an instruction sua sponte? 
To overcome the presumption that his counsel rendered effective assistance, defendant 
must show that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonability and 
(2) that but for counsel's deficient performance a more favorable outcome would have been 
obtained. State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848, 858 (Utah App. 1992). Similarly, in order to 
prove the trial court committed plain error, defendant must prove both that the error was 
obvious and prejudicial. State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTnVHQNAL PROVISIONS! STATUTES ANP RULES 
The text of any pertinent provisions, statutes or rules is included in the Argument 
section of this brief as needed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with three counts of theft by deception, one third degree felony 
and two second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6405 (1995) (R. 7, 170-
72). After a jury trial, defendant was convicted on all counts as charged (R. 393-94, 397). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of zero to five years on the first count and two 
terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on the remaining counts, with all terms 
to run concurrently (R. 149, 419, 420). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict. Accordingly, the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom is reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. 
Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989). 
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The Elizopdos 
In 1992, Frank and Stephanie Elizondo of Grass Valley, California decided they 
wanted to adopt a baby because they had been unable to have children (R. 880, 899). As part 
of their effort to adopt a child, the Elizondos contacted Mr. John Giffen, an attorney in St. 
George, Utah, who specializes in adoptions in both California and Utah (R. 880-81, 922).l 
Near the end of 1992, the Elizondos learned that Giffen had found someone interested in 
placing their baby with them (R. 881). 
In early November, 1992, Giffen received a telephone call from defendant's wife, 
Tonya Vigil (R. 923). She told Giffen that she and defendant were interested in placing their 
unborn baby for adoption (R. 923). Giffen explained to her how independent (private) 
adoptions work and offered to have his paralegal in Salt Lake City, Saunya Schuchart, meet 
with Tonya and defendant (R. 923-24). Giffen selected six or seven "resumes" of potential 
adoptive families that he felt might be compatible with what defendant's wife said she was 
looking for (R. 947) and had Schuchart show them to defendant and his wife (R. 924). 
Schuchart met with defendant and his wife and showed them a book of resumes 
maintained by Giffen (R. 1006-07). She identified prospective couples for them, including the 
Elizondos (R. 1007). Defendant and his wife asked Schuchart if the adoptive couples could 
help with their living and medical expenses, and Schuchart indicated they could (R. 1007-08). 
From the book of resumes, defendant and his wife selected the Elizondos as the couple with 
whom they wished to place their baby (R. 924, 1021, 1023). Defendant and his wife 
1
 Giffen testified that he had completed 400 to 500 adoptions since he began specializing 
in adoptions in 1983 (922-23). 
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participated equally in the process of reviewing the resumes and selecting the Elizondos (R. 
1024). 
Sandy French, a paralegal in California who worked for Giffen, told Frank Elizondo 
that defendant and his wife had reviewed the Elizondo's "resume" and were interested in them 
(R. 881). Tonya Vigil was living at her mother's home, and French gave Frank Elizondo the 
phone number there so that he could contact the Vigils directly (R. 881-82). 
Mr. Elizondo called the number and spoke with defendant's wife (R. 882). Elizondo 
explained that he and his wife had no children and that they were trying to adopt a baby 
because they were "motivated to be parents" (882). Mr. Elizondo spoke with defendant and 
defendant's wife periodically, but once defendant and his wife indicated that they were going 
to place their baby with the Elizondos, Elizondo dealt primarily with Sandy French and 
Saunya Schuchart (R. 882-83). 
When defendant and his wife first contacted Giffen and met Schuchart, neither 
defendant nor his wife had a job, they were essentially "destitute" and were living with 
relatives (R. 925, 1009, 1025, 1028). Defendant called Schuchart and asked her to help them 
find an apartment, and she said that would be "no problem" (R. 1009). Once it was agreed 
that defendant and his wife would allow the Elizondos to adopt their baby, Giffen arranged for 
defendant and his wife to get a hotel room for several days, which was paid for with funds 
from the Elizondos (R. 925). After Giffen guaranteed that the rent would be paid for four 
months - through March 1993 - Schuchart was able get an apartment for defendant and his 
wife (R. 925, 955-56, 1011, 1027; Defense Exhibit 9). 
In late November, Giffen went to Salt Lake City to meet with defendant and his wife 
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(R. 929-30). At that meeting, Giffen explained that he represented the Elizondos and that it 
was a potential conflict for him to represent them as well unless they waived that conflict (R. 
929-30). Giffen also explained a form entitled "ILLEGALITY PITFALLS IN 
INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS" and told defendant and his wife that an adoptive couple 
could not "pay for a baby" and that defendant and his wife could not accept money in return 
for consenting to an adoption (R. 930; State's Exhibit 10). (A copy of Giffen's "Pitfalls" 
form that was signed by defendant and his wife is attached hereto as addendum A.) Rather, 
defendant and his wife had to agree to the adoption because they wanted to place their baby for 
adoption and not because they were being paid (R. 930). 
Although Giffen's "Pitfalls" form cited only provisions of the California penal code, he 
told defendant and his wife that Utah law was "very similar" (R. 930-32). Giffen read 
through the form with defendant and his wife and both defendant and his wife signed it (R. 
932-33, 992; State's Exhibit 10). Among other things, Giffen explained to defendant and his 
wife "that it [wa]s a crime, as well as being unethical, in [his] opinion, for them to take money 
[from prospective adoptive couples] without [having] the intention of giving the baby [up for 
adoption]" (R. 932, 992). Because he had seen publicity about other birth mothers taking 
money from more than one couple, Giffen also told defendant and his wife that it was "illegal 
. . . to take money from more than one couple without the intention of going through with an 
adoption" (R. 992). Giffen also explained that only pregnancy-related expenses could be paid 
and specifically told defendant and his wife that the adoptive parents could not buy them a car 
(R. 933) 
The Elizondos ultimately agreed to pay defendant and his wife $500.00 a month for 
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living and pregnancy-related expenses (R. 882, 884). On November 5, 1992, the Elizondos 
wired an initial payment of $1,200.00, part of which was used to get an apartment for 
defendant and his wife (R. 883-84). 
At the beginning of December, 1992, the Elizondos sent another $500.00 to pay the 
rent and other living expenses for defendant and his wife (R. 885). In about mid-December, 
defendant's wife requested additional money so that she could buy Christmas presents for her 
other children (R. 885). Elizondo was reluctant to do that because he understood the expenses 
he paid had to be "pregnancy-related" (R. 885). After defendant's wife indicated that she 
would pay the rent for January if Elizondo would help her in December, Elizondo agreed to 
the request, making the total amount that the Elizondos gave defendant and his wife during the 
month of December about $1,000 (R. 885-86). Mr. Elizondo spoke to defendant at least once 
at the end of December or the beginning of January (R. 886). It was a short conversation in 
which they discussed how defendant and his wife were-doing (R. 886). 
In January 1993, Elizondo learned that defendant and his wife had not paid their 
January rent. Feeling that his "hands were more or less tied," Elizondo paid another $500.00 
(R. 886). Elizondo maintained contact with defendant's wife during January, and he 
eventually asked if he and his wife could come to Salt Lake City to visit (R. 887). 
Defendant's wife agreed, and the Elizondos made arrangements to fly to Salt Lake in the 
middle of February (R. 887). 
When the Elizondos came to Salt Lake in mid-February, they spent the first night at a 
hotel near the airport. The next day, Saunya Schuchart picked them up drove them to 
defendant's apartment and introduced them to defendant, defendant's wife, and their family. 
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Schuchart then left (R. 888). 
Defendant had a car and suggested that they (defendant, his wife and Mr. & Mrs. 
Elizondo) go to lunch. After lunch, defendant was driving the four around Salt Lake City 
when defendant's wife suggested that they go to the maternity ward at St. Mark's hospital 
where she planned to have her baby (R. 888). While the Elizondos and defendant's wife went 
inside St. Marks, defendant stayed outside in the car (R. 888). A short time later, defendant 
came in looking for his wife, and the four of them went back to defendant's apartment to pick 
up the Elizondos's baggage (R. 888-89). From there, defendant and his wife took the 
Elizondos to the airport. The Elizondos left Salt Lake believing the visit had gone well and 
were especially pleased that defendant's wife had given them a baby blanket that one of her 
mother's friends had made (R. 889). 
During most of February, Elizondo's telephone calls were nearly always answered by 
defendant (R. 890, 917), and his contact with defendant's wife diminished compared to how it 
had been in November, December and January (R. 903, 917). During some of their 
conversations, defendant told Elizondo that he wanted to "have control" over the money that 
the Elizondos were sending him and his wife and on that basis asked Elizondo to send money 
directly to him instead transferring it through Giffen (R. 886-87, 888-89). By late February, 
Mr. Elizondo was not only concerned that defendant "had taken control of the telephone calls" 
between the Elizondos and defendant's family (R. 903-04), but he was also concerned that 
defendant was asking for money to pay for things that ahad nothing to do with the pregnancy" 
(R. 917). 
Sometime in late February or the beginning of March, defendant called Mr. Elizondo 
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and suggested that the Elizondos "change lawyers" because "[defendant was] not happy with 
John Giffen" (R. 889, 905-06). Defendant again explained that he wanted control over the 
money that the Elizondos were giving to him and his wife (R. 918). That idea did not appeal 
to Elizondo because the one month that defendant was in control of the finances defendant 
"misappropriated" that month's payment, and the Elizondos had to make another payment to 
cover defendant's rent (R. 918).2 Elizondo told defendant he was not sure how his contract 
with Giffen was structured but said he believed he was "legally bound to Giffen" (R. 889). 
Later that day, defendant again called Elizondo and told him he needed $1,500.00 to buy a car 
(R. 890). Defendant's request concerned Elizondo because defendant was asking him to pay 
for something that was unrelated to the pregnancy (R. 917). 
Elizondo told defendant he could not send him $1,500.00 because he could not send 
any money directly to defendant. Elizondo explained that all of the money had to go through 
Giffen so that it could be "monitored through John Giffen and . . . [disbursed] to Tonya as 
needed for pregnancy-related issues" (R. 890). Elizondo also told defendant that he and his 
wife did not "have that type of money" and emphasized that they had "estimated a certain 
amount of money that it would actually cost to adopt a baby" and that they had already 
borrowed money from both his wife's parents and his own parents in order to gather the 
necessary funds (R. 890). Defendant became angry and instructed Elizondo not to say 
anything to John Giffen about his request for $1,500.00 or what he intended to do with that 
2
 Not only did the Elizondos end up giving defendant and his wife money twice for their 
December rent, but they had to do the same thing for defendant's March rent (R. 938-39,960; 
Defense Exhibit 14). 
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money (R. 891).3 
During March, the Elizondos called defendant and his wife two or three times a week 
because it was "getting close to the due date and [they] were concerned about [defendant's 
wife's] health (R. 891). Many of those telephone conversations were "strictly" with 
defendant, and defendant "reassured" Mr. Elizondo that his wife and his family were "doing 
fine" (R. 893). 
At some point, defendant and his wife talked to the Elizondos about how they would let 
the Elizondos know when to come to Salt Lake. It was decided that either defendant or his 
wife would call the Elizondos when defendant's wife went into labor, and the Elizondos would 
fly to Salt Lake and meet defendant and his wife at the hospital (R. 894). On March 12th or 
13th, Elizondo was unable to contact defendant or his wife (R. 893). Thinking defendant's 
wife may have gone into labor, Elizondo called the maternity ward at St. Mark's Hospital. 
Elizondo was eventually able to speak with defendant, who reported that his wife was having a 
routine examination to check her "stress level" (R. 893-94). 
Elizondo continued to speak to defendant almost daily (R. 894). On Monday, March 
15, defendant told Elizondo his wife was "resting" and said that her next doctor's 
appointment was on Tuesday (R. 895, 909). Elizondo called on Tuesday, March 16, and 
defendant told him that his wife's appointment was changed to the next day (R. 895). When 
3
 As it turns out, defendant himself called Giffen in late February and asked him for 
money to buy a car (R. 981). Giffen told defendant he could not do that and offered that 
Schuchart would take defendant's wife to her doctor's appointments as she had done in the past 
(R. 981). Defendant also asked Schuchart if she could get him money for a car, and she relayed 
that information to Giffen (R. 1048-49,1051-52). 
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Elizondo called defendant on Wednesday, March 17, he learned that the phone had been 
disconnected (R. 895). 
The next day, defendant's wife went to the hospital early in the morning at about 5:00, 
and she gave birth to a baby girl at about 5:00 p.m. that afternoon (R. 1072, Defendant's 
exhibit 16). Neither defendant nor his wife called the Elizondos to report that defendant's 
wife was in labor. Indeed, defendant and his wife never called the Elizondos to report that the 
baby had been born (R. 894, 897). The Elizondo did not know the baby had been born on 
March 18 until a week later, Thursday, March 25, 1993, when they received a phone call 
from Schuchart (R. 896-97, 908-09). 
On March 20th, two days after the baby was born, Schuchart tried to call defendant 
and his wife, only to discover that the phone had been disconnected. Concerned since she had 
just paid the phone bill, Schuchart went to defendant's apartment the next day (R. 1016, 036-
37). Schuchart knew that defendant's wife was "due soon," and wanted to check how they 
were doing (R. 1016). Defendant invited Schuchart in and eventually "brought out a brand 
new infant" and said, *[t]his is Alexandria" (R. 1016). Schuchart had not known until then 
that the baby had been born (R. 1017-18). Defendant asked, "Could you give this baby up," 
which made clear to Schuchart that defendant and his wife were going to keep their baby (R. 
1037-38. 1046, 1049). 
From November 5, 1992 to March 19, 1993, the Elizondos paid a total of about 
$4,300.00 to defendant and his wife (R. 883, 897, 911, 1013)/ The Elizondos did not know 
4
 In February the Elizondos paid defendant and his wife: $375.00 for rent on and $50.00 
for clothes on February 1; $100.00 for food and $100.00 for utilities February 18; and $500.00 
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defendant and his wife were accepting money from other adoptive parents. Had they known 
that fact, the Elizondos would not have given money to defendant and his wife (897-98). 
Giffen was likewise unaware of the fact that defendant and his wife were getting money from 
other adoptive couples and would not have authorized payments to defendant and his wife on 
behalf of the Elizondos had he known about the other couples (R. 941). 
The Bushmans 
At the same time that defendant was soliciting and accepting money from the Elizondos 
during February and March of 1993, he and his wife were meeting with another attorney 
under the pretense of locating a family to adopt their child. Specifically, in late February 
defendant's wife called Mr. Rex Bushman, an attorney in Salt Lake City, and made an 
appointment for her and the defendant to meet with Bushman (R. 754-55, 760). 
Defendant and his wife met with Bushman at his office on February 24, 1993 (R. 760, 
786). During that meeting, defendant and his wife told Bushman they were interested in 
finding a family to adopt their baby (R. 755, 786-88). Defendant and his wife said that they 
could not afford the expense of having a baby, and Bushman offered to pay their medical 
expense, which he viewed as being "standard" procedure in adoptions (R. 757-58, 788-89). 
Bushman explained that he could help them find a family, and asked defendant and his 
wife if they would consider allowing him and his family to adopt the baby (R. 786-88). They 
for rent and related expenses on February 24; (R. 1013; State's Exhibits 9,11, 12 & 14; Defense 
Exhibit 14). The March payments included $500.00 for rent and utilities on March 8; $50.00 for 
clothing on March 10 or 11; $150.00 for food and $82.24 to pay defendant's telephone bill on 
March 18; and $250 for a cleaning deposit on defendant's apartment on March 19 (R. 1034-35, 
1043-45,1049). 
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were open to that idea, and Bushman showed them some pictures of his wife and their four 
children. He explained that they wanted more children and that his wife had had two 
miscarriages (R. 770-71). 
Defendant and his wife agreed to place their baby with Bushman's family (R. 756-57). 
The next day, Bushman sent a letter to defendant and his wife "to reiterate that [his] family 
w[ould] plan to adopt the baby" and that he would pay for the baby's delivery (R. 786-87; 
Defense Exhibit 4). 
On about March 2nd or 3rd, defendant called Bushman and said that he and his wife 
needed money to pay their rent and utilities and to buy food (R. 761-62). Because Bushman 
had only agreed to pay for medical expenses, he was concerned that there would be future 
requests for more money and decided to ask defendant to "come up with an amount" that 
would meet their needs (R. 762). Defendant called back later and told Bushman that, in 
addition to Bushman paying their medical expenses, $1,500.00 would cover their costs (R. 
762). 
Defendant and his wife met with Bushman a second time on March 5 to formalize their 
agreement concerning payment of maternity expenses and related issues (R. 758-60, 799). At 
that meeting, Bushman explained, and defendant and his wife signed, a waiver of conflict of 
interest form indicating that they had no objection to Bushman both representing them and 
arranging for his family to adopt their baby (R. 761; State's Exhibit 3). Bushman also gave 
them two checks that totaled $500.00 (R. 763-65). The first check was to pay their February 
rent of $390.00 and was made payable to "Jim Corbett," who defendant and his wife said was 
their landlord (R. 763-64; State's Exhibit 4). The second check was for $110.00 to pay for 
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utilities, groceries or other living expenses and was made payable to defendant's wife (R. 764; 
State's Exhibit 5). Bushman further agreed that he would pay defendant and his wife the 
remaining $1,000.00 after they consented to the adoption (R. 763). 
Bushman called periodically to check on how defendant's wife was doing because he 
was expecting that the baby would be born soon (R. 766). During one of those phone calls 
that occurred sometime after March 19, 1993, defendant and his wife "were kind of quiet" 
when Bushman asked if "the adoption was still on" (R. 766). Defendant's wife assured him 
that it was (R. 766). 
The next time Bushman tried to call defendant and his wife he learned that their 
telephone had been disconnected (R. 767). Bushman then called the police, and the next night 
he saw defendant and his wife on the television news (R. 767-78). 
Bushman expected that defendant and his wife would allow him to adopt their baby and 
on March 5, 1993 he gave them a total of $500.00 to help pay their living expenses. Had he 
not believed defendant and his wife were going to allow his family to adopt their baby, 
Bushman would not have given defendant and his wife any money (R. 768-69). Nor would 
Bushman have given defendant and his wife any money had he known that they were also 
accepting money from other prospective adoptive parents (R. 768-69). 
The Hallidays 
On about March 3rd or 4th, 1993, defendant's wife contacted attorney Marilyn 
Fineshriber and told her that she and her husband were interested in placing their baby up for 
adoption (R. 821, 843-44). Defendant and his wife eventually met with Fineshriber on March 
7th or 8th, 1993 (R. 822, 859). During that meeting, defendant's wife told Fineshriber she 
14 
was due to have her baby on March 28, 1993 (R. 825), and talked about what kind of family 
structure, child rearing practices and income she was looking for in an adoptive family (R. 
823, 845). Defendant explained that he and his wife could not afford to raise the baby (R. 
823-24). 
Fineshriber discussed defendant's and defendant's wife's family and medical histories 
and told them about the legal effects of consenting to an adoption (R. 823-25). She also told 
them, however, that she was not their attorney because she would represent the adoptive 
parents. She advised them to get an attorney of their own, and said that she would advise her 
clients to pay for that attorney (R. 825). 
Fineshriber had a number of couples in mind that she believed would be interested in 
adopting defendant's baby (R. 826). One of those couples was Paul and Vickie Halliday, a 
couple who had been working with several attorneys, including Fineshriber, in hopes of 
adopting a baby (R. 802-04). She had a conference call with the Hallidays, and they said they 
were interested in adopting defendant's baby (R. 826). Fineshriber described the Hallidays to 
defendant and his wife and assured them that they appeared to meet all of their qualifications 
(R. 845-46). 
By March 12, 1993, defendant had his wife had agreed to allow that Hallidays to adopt 
defendant's baby in a "closed adoption," meaning that the two couples would not know each 
other's identity and would not meet face-to-face (R. 826, 844). The Hallidays agreed to pay 
the expenses related to the pregnancy and adoption. Paul Halliday delivered a check for 
$1,500.00 to Fineshriber on March 12, 1993 (R. 805-06). Of that, $600.00 was to pay 
Fineshriber's retainer fee and $900.00 would be given to defendant and his wife to pay their 
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immediate living expense (R. 805-06, 827). 
After the Hallidays had left, both defendant and his wife came to Fineshriber's office 
on March 12 to pick up a check for $900.00 (R. 828, 846). 
Fineshriber spoke to defendant's wife by telephone on March 23, 1993 (R. 830). At 
that point, Fineshriber assumed that the baby had not yet been born, and defendant's wife did 
not tell her otherwise. Defendant's wife also said that "everything was on schedule," that she 
and defendant were still planning on completing the adoption, and that they did not need an 
attorney (R. 830-32). 
On March 24, 1993, defendant called Fineshriber and said that he and his wife needed 
another $500.00 because they had already spent the $900.00 and were still behind on their 
utilities and other expenses (R. 828, 831-32). Fineshriber asked defendant "whether they were 
still persuaded that they wanted to go forward with the adoption since that would be the only 
way the money would be available" and defendant said "yes" (R. 832). Defendant did not tell 
Fineshriber that the baby had already been born (R. 832). Fineshriber called Halliday and, 
given the expenses that remained to be paid, they decided it would be best to pay defendant 
and his wife $600.00 instead of the requested $100.00 (R. 832). 
Halliday went to Fineshriber's office the next day, March 26th, and gave her a check 
for $1092.00 to cover additional attorney's fees as well as the $600.00 he had agreed to pay 
defendant and his wife (R. 806, 829). Halliday also picked up a "Petition for Adoption" that 
Fineshriber had prepared in anticipation of the baby's birth (R. 806). 
On March 26, 1993, Fineshriber wrote a check for $600.00 to defendant's wife, and 
defendant picked it up that same day (R. 829, 832, 855-56). 
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Halliday returned the "Petition for Adoption" to Fineshriber on March 29, 1993, and 
he called her again on March 31st to find out if the baby had been born (R. 806, 808). 
Fineshriber had not heard from either defendant nor his wife since defendant had picked up the 
check for $600.00 on March 26, 1993. When she called their apartment, she was told the 
phone had been disconnected (R. 829). 
Defendant and his wife never placed the baby with the Hallidays (R. 810, 835), and 
neither the Hallidays nor Fineshriber knew defendant was soliciting and accepting money from 
other would be adoptive couples (R, 811, 836). Fineshriber would not have authorized, and 
the Hallidays would not have made, any payments to defendant and his wife had they know 
defendant was getting money from other couples (R. 811, 823, 870). 
From March 12 to March 26, 1993, defendant accepted $1,500.00 from the Hallidays. 
Had the Hallidays known that defendant and his wife were not going to allow their baby to be 
adopted, the would not have made paid defendant's and his wife's living expenses (R. 811). 
The Hallidays filed a civil suit against defendant and his wife to recover the $1,500.00 (R. 
817). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's voir dire of potential jurors was thorough and permitted counsel to 
adequately evaluate each potential juror. Not only did the trial court ask the entire jury panel 
extensive questions to reveal any potential biases, but it also asked follow up questions of 
those jurors who indicated they had seen media reports involving failed adoptions. 
Defendant's claim that the trial court did not adequately question the jury panel simply because 
the court refused to ask some of defendant's proposed questions and to allow in camera 
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interrogation of publicity exposed jurors should therefore be rejected. 
The trial court also properly instructed the jury that theft by deception could occur in 
the context of a failed adoption proceeding only if the State established all elements of that 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the court's jury instructions on that issue were 
accurate statements of the law, it cannot be said the trial court erred. Similarly, the trial court 
properly refused to instruct the jury about rules 1.7 and 1.8, Utah Code of Professional 
Conduct, because the issue of whether the attorneys with whom defendant spoke during the 
course of three failed adoptions violated any rule of professional conduct was irrelevant. 
Also irrelevant was the proffered testimony of Roland Oliver, defendant's expert 
witness on how adoption agencies typically operate in Utah. The adoption proceedings at 
issue in defendant's case were all private adoptions. Accordingly, how defendant may have 
proceeded in the hypothetical context of an agency adoption was irrelevant under rule 402, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. In any event, the trial court acted well within its discretion when it 
alternatively held Oliver's proffered evidence inadmissible under rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, on the ground that it was likely to confuse or mislead the jury. 
Finally, defendant has failed to establish that his trial counsel's alleged failure to 
request a jury instruction about the statutory defenses to theft that are codified in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-402(3) (1995), constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The record evidence 
supported a different defense theory that counsel presented to the jury. Under the 
circumstances, counsel could have properly determined that defendant's best defense was his 
claim that he did not knowingly or intentionally deceive the victims. Defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel should therefore be rejected. Defendant's claim that Judge 
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Medley committed plain error by not instructing the jury on section 76-6-402(3) should 
likewise be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CONDUCTED ADEQUATE JUROR VOIR DIRE, 
The trial court's voir dire of potential jurors was sufficient "to detect actual bias and to 
permit counsel to make an informed exercise of peremptory challenges." State v. Ontiveros. 
835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Sherard. 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App. 
1991)). Nevertheless, defendant complains that the trial court erred in not asking two of his 
proposed voir dire questions of all potential jurors, Br. of Def. at 15, and that the trial court's 
follow-up questioning of two jurors about their exposure to media concerning adoption 
proceedings was inadequate. Br. of Def. at 16-20. As demonstrated below, both of 
defendant's claims fail. 
"The manner and method of voir dire lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court." Ontiveros. 835 P.2d at 204 (quoting State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 797 (Utah 1991)). 
Thus, a trial court's decision of what questions to ask during voir dire will be reversed only if 
the trial court abuses its discretion. IJL at 205. Whether a trial court abused its discretion in 
conducting voir dire depends on whether, "considering the totality of the questioning" the trial 
court exercised "due diligence* in the effort to secure an impartial jury such that "counsel was 
afforded adequate opportunity to acquire the information necessary to evaluate [prospective] 
jurors. " State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439. 448 (Utah 1988V On appeal, the burden is on 
defendant to demonstrate that the trial court failed in this duty. I$L 
19 
A. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Ask Defendant's 
Proposed Juror Voir Dire Questions 27 and 28. 
After the trial court had completed its initial voir dire of prospective jurors, it excused 
the jury and reconvened in chambers for an on the record discussion with counsel about which 
jurors should be stricken for cause and whether counsel desired to have the court ask any 
additional questions (R. 704-712). Among others, defendant requested that the trial court pose 
the following questions: 
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the conclusion that the 
prosecution had not proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and you found that a majority of the jurors believed the defendant was guilty, 
would you change your verdict only because you were in the minority? 
28. Are there any of you who are not in such a fair and impartial state 
of mind that you would not be satisfied to have a juror possessing your mental 
state judge the evidence if you or your loved ones were on trial here? In other 
words, would you want someone with your state of mind sitting as a juror on 
this case if you were the defendant? 
(R. 709).5 
After a brief discussion, the trial court indicated it would not ask defendant's proposed 
questions because the court was "satisfied that it ha[d] covered that matter in substance and 
[that] the questions w[ould] not be given in the form they [we]re proposed" by defendant (R. 
710). 
With respect to question 27, defendant cites no authority for the proposition that such a 
question must be asked during voir dire. More importantly, he has failed to demonstrate that 
the court's decision not to ask question 27 hampered counsel's ability to make challenges for 
5
 Questions 27 and 28 were among 31 proposed voir dire questions submitted by 
defendant before voir dire (R. 338-42). 
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cause or to exercise peremptory challenges. Absent a properly researched and articulated 
argument on appeal, this Court should decline to address the merits of defendant question 27 
challenge. Ss£ generally. Bishop. 753 P.2d at 450 ("a reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research). 
In any event, defendant has failed to demonstrate that question 27 would likely have 
revealed any bias on the part of potential jurors, and the multitude of questions posed by the 
trial court during voir dire provided ample insight into the jury pool to allow counsel to 
meaningfully evaluate each potential juror. The trial court's refusal to ask defendant's 
proposed question was therefore not an abuse of discretion. 
Considering the trial court's extensive voir dire of each potential juror, both as a group 
and individually, the trial court's questioning made clear that it was interested in uncovering 
anything that might cast doubt on the issue of whether the jurors had a "fair and impartial state 
of mind." It therefore covered, in substance, the thrust of defendant's proposed voir dire 
question 28. For instance, the court asked each juror if they had any involvement with 
adoptions; whether they had strong feelings about adoptions; whether they or a family member 
had been the victim of any crime; whether they knew any of the attorneys, witnesses or 
defendants; whether they had any involvement or relationship to members of law 
enforcement; and whether they had any mental or physical ailment that might prevent them 
from being fair and impartial. The trial court also asked the potential jurors whether they had 
been exposed to any media accounts about defendant's case or adoptions in general. 
Considering the thoroughness of the court's questioning on issues that might call into question 
21 
a juror's "fair and impartial state of mind," it is difficult to see what would have been 
accomplished by asking defendant's proposed question 28. Moreover, near the conclusion of 
its initial voir dire, the trial court made the following comment to the panel of potential 
jurors: 
Members of the jury panel, let me also say to you that I hope by now 
certainly you have got the impression that it is going to be your responsibility to 
be fair and impartial to both sides of this particular lawsuit. 
(R. 701). The trial court's comment was an invitation to the potential jurors to tell the court 
about any concerns they may have harbored about their ability to serve in a fair and in partial 
manner. It was therefore the functional equivalent of defendant's proposed question 28. 
In sum, defendant has failed to establish that the trial court's voir dire did not 
adequately cover the substance of defendant's proposed questions 27 and 28 or how the trial 
court's decision not to ask those specific questions prevented counsel from assessing the 
potential jurors. 
B. The Trial Court Adequately Questioned Jurors Wvlie and Reese 
About Their Exposure to Media Accowrts of Adoption Proceedings! 
Defendant next complains that the trial court's questioning of two potential jurors about 
media accounts of adoption proceedings was inadequate. As demonstrated below, the trial 
court conducted voir dire of the potential jurors in the manner prescribed by this Court. 
During its supplemental voir dire, the trial court - at defendant's request - asked the 
potential jurors whether any of them "recalled] reading or seeing on television or hearing on 
the radio anything regarding [defendants'] case?" (R. 714). Two potential jurors, Ms. Floor 
and Ms. Anderson, raised their hands, both of whom the trial court had already determined 
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would be excused for cause (R. 705-06, 713-14). Neither sat on the jury (R. 719), and 
defendant does not contest the trial court's examination of them. £f. State v. Ontiveros. 835 
P. 2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992) (where two potential jurors who were exposed to pretrial 
publicity were successfully challenged for cause, any error in the trial court's voir dire of them 
was harmless). 
Again at the defendant's request, the trial court then posed the following question: 
Now, let me also ask somewhat of a related question, members of the 
jury panel. I would like to know at this time whether or not any member of the 
jury panel has seen any recent television programs or received any other 
information depicting attempted adoptions? Let me restate that. I would like to 
know whether any member of the panel has seen any recent television programs 
or received any other information depicting attempted adoptions. And if so, 
would you please indicate this by raising your hand at this time and keep those 
hands up there long enough for me so I can see who has their hand raised. Mr. 
Pepper has his hand raised and Ms. Wylie has her hand [raised] and Mr. Jerman 
has his hand raised. 
(R. 714). Another potential juror, Ms. Reese, also raised her hand (R. 7171). 
The trial court had already determined that it was going to strike jurors Pepper and 
Jerman for cause, and neither sat on the jury (R. 705-07, 715-16, 719). Defendant therefore 
does not challenge the trial court's voir dire of Pepper and Jerman. Cf. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 
at 205. Defendant argues only that the trial court should have permitted more extensive 
questioning of jurors Wylie and Reese in camera. But a review of the record indicates that 
the trial court's questioning of both Wylie and Reese was adequate. 
During follow-up voir dire, juror Wylie revealed that she had a very limited memory 
of the adoption stories she had seen: 
THE COURT: . . . And Ms. Wylie, what program was it [that you saw]? 
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MS. WYLIE: 
THE COURT: 
MS. WYLIE: 
THE COURT: 
THE COURT: 
MS. WYLIE: 
THE COURT: 
MS. WYLIE: 
THE COURT: 
MS. WYLIE: 
I don't know. Just a documentary. 
How long ago was that? 
Within six months and then in the Ladies Home Journal I think 
there was an article too. 
Do you recall the subject matter of the documentary or the article 
in the Ladies Home Journal? 
MS. WYLIE: I just know its adoption and then they changed their mind. 
THE COURT: Was that the subject matter of those issues? 
MS. WYLIE: Uh-huh. 
Let me ask you this question, Ms. Wylie. As a result of the 
documentary or the article in the magazine, and considering the 
nature of today's case, would any of that information interfere 
with your responsibility to be fair and impartial? 
No. Not really. 
You are certain you could remain fair and impartial to both sides 
of this case? 
I think, yes. 
Obviously you use the word "think." Do you have a hesitation? 
I don't remember the story in that detail, you know. I think I can 
listen impartially. 
Thank you very much, Ms. Wylie. . . . THE COURT: 
(R. 715-716). 
The trial court's questioning of Ms. Reese revealed similar information: 
THE COURT: 
MS. REESE: 
. . . The record may reflect that there is an additional hand 
raised. Just one second. Ms. Reese, you have your hand raised? 
Yes. I watched a television program within the last three months 
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"Attempted Adoption." 
THE COURT: Do you remember the thrust or major points of the program you 
saw? 
MS. REESE: The major thing was that the child was up for adoption and then 
their minds were changed and the natural parents got the child 
back. 
THE COURT: Would any of that information interfere with you abilities to be 
fair and impartial to both sides of this lawsuit, Ms. Reese? 
MS. REESE: No. 
(R. 717). 
The trial court then asked counsel to approach the bench for a sidebar conference (R. 
717). During that sidebar, defendant's counsel requested an in camera voir dire of potential 
jurors Wylie and Reese because both of them had "indicated that they had seen television 
programs recently dealing with an adoption situation [and he believed the Court] needed to 
question them further regarding what the program was they saw and how they felt about it" 
(R. 725). The trial court denied defendant's request on the ground that "the totality of the 
questions put to all of the panel members, as well as those two panel members in particular, 
was appropriate and sufficient" and because the court followed up with Wylie and Reese to 
make sure that they could be fair and impartial (R. 726). Defendant did not challenge either 
Wylie or Reese for cause, and both ultimately sat on the jury (R. 719). 
The facts of this case are similar to those this Court encountered in Ontiveros. There 
this Court summarized the pertinent facts as follows: 
In the present case, four prospective jurors acknowledged having been 
exposed to some form of pretrial publicity. Any error concerning prospective 
jurors Moore and Lujan would have been harmless because they were 
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successfully challenged for cause. The other two jurors, Nelson and Jones, 
acknowledged reading something about the [Ontiverosl case, but indicated they 
couldn't recall any details. During subsequent voir dire, Ontiveros asked the 
trial court to allow individual questioning of the publicity-exposed jurors 
concerning the content of the publicity. The trial court responded by asking 
three separate follow-up questions concerning the prospective jurors' ability to 
hear the case impartially. After the prospective jurors had indicated they would 
be able to hear the case impartially, the trial judge denied the request for 
individual interrogation. 
Ontiveros. 835 P.2d at 205. 
In light of the above facts, the Ontiveros Court upheld the trial court's ruling: 
The two publicity-exposed jurors who sat on the fOntiveros] jury panel 
explicitly stated that they could remember no details concerning the case. Any 
further questioning could have required the prospective jurors to recall details 
they could not remember and risked exposing them to facts concerning the 
present case. Considering the totality of the voir dire and the responses from 
Nelson and Jones, we find Ontiveros was given an adequate opportunity to 
acquire the information necessary to evaluate the prospective jurors. 
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In the instant, case publicity-exposed jurors did not see stories about the particular case 
at hand. Rather, they saw stories about other attempted adoptions in which the "natural 
parents" changed their minds. As such, any inference of prejudice to be drawn from that 
publicity is not as strong as was present in Ontiveros. Moreover, the trial court's voir dire of 
potential jurors Wylie and Reese was in keeping with the voir dire this Court approved in 
Ontiveros. As the record shows, the trial court questioned both Wylie and Reese about the 
content of the media accounts they had seen. Counsel knew that Wylie and Reese had seen 
stories about failed adoptions in which the "natural parents" got their children back because 
"they changed their minds." Like the jurors at issue in Onitveros. both Wylie and Reese had 
only limited memories of the stories they had seen, and both indicated that their exposure to 
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that publicity would not interfere with their ability to be fair and impartial (R. 715-717). 
The trial court's questioning of Wylie and Reese provided counsel adequate opportunity 
to evaluate them as prospective jurors. In keeping with Ontiveros. this Court should therefore 
hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in limiting voir dire.6 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT 
THEFT BY DECEPTION CAN OCCUR IN ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS 
PROVIDED ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THAT OFFENSE ARE 
PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
Under Utah law, criminal statutes should be "construed according to the fair import of 
their terms to promote justicef.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1995). So construed, Utah's 
theft by deception statute prohibits defendant's conduct: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with the purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (1995). 
6
 Defendant's reliance on jury voir dire cases involving exposure to "tort reform 
propaganda" is misplaced. Because of the prevalence of publicity suggesting that high monetary 
awards in tort cases caused insurance premiums to rise unnecessarily, this Court has made clear 
that "in tort cases, and more particularly in medical malpractice cases, [courts] cannot ignore the 
reality that potential jurors may have developed tort-reform biases as a result of overall exposure 
to such propaganda." Evans v. Dotv. 824 P.2d 460,467 (Utah App. 1991), cert denied, 836 
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Accord. Barrett v. Peterson. 868 P.2d 96,101 (Utah App. 1993). Such 
cases as Evans and Peterson are plainly based on the belief that exposure to <4tort reform 
propaganda" was especially likely to create a biased mind set in potential jurors. 
In this case, defendant made no showing that there had been pervasive "anti-birth parent 
propaganda" that raised a presumption of prejudice akin to that associated with i4tort reform 
propaganda." In any event, the trial court conducted voir dire in a manner consistent with Evans 
and Doty because it asked the potential jurors if they had been exposed to media accounts of 
adoption proceedings and questioned those jurors who indicated they had seen such stories where 
they had seen them, what they remember about the stories, and whether they would be 
influenced by what they had seen or heard (R. 714-17). 
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Defendant does not argue that there was not sufficient evidence to support his 
conviction, a decision that is well measured in light of the evidence presented by the State at 
trial. Instead, defendant argues that the necessary element of actual reliance upon his 
misrepresentations could not, as a matter of law, have been established in this or any other 
case involving an adoption. 
Defendant's argument takes on various forms in different parts of his brief. In Point II 
of his brief, defendant argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that theft by 
deception could occur in the context of an anticipated adoption "because the [funds] at issue 
[are] given to the birth mother as a charitable contribution, and not as consideration for her 
promised performance to consent to the adoption.*1 Br. of Def. at 22. Similarly, in Point V of 
his brief, defendant argues that charitable contributions made to birth parents based on their 
assertion that they intend to place their baby for adoption can never be the object of theft by 
deception under Utah law because the false representations relate to a matter "having no 
pecuniary significance*' and "[b]ecause the victims in the context of an adoption cannot rely on 
the birth parents to consent to the adoption [as grounds for establishing] reliance causing them 
to part with their money[.]" Br. of Def. at 39 (citation omitted). 
All of defendant's arguments in Points II and V of his brief boil down to a single issue: 
"Does Theft By Deception occur where birth parents falsely represent that they intend to place 
their baby with an adoptive family and that adoptive family, relying on the false 
representation, makes a charitable contribution to the birth parents as permitted under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-7-203?" Defendant claims the answer is "no" because potential adoptive 
couples cannot, as a matter of law, rely on the birth parents* false representations. Defendant 
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misapprehends the element of reliance, both in a legal sense and in terms of the facts of this 
particular case. 
This Court has emphasized that "[t]he offense of theft by deception is plainly intended 
to protect unwary members of the public from a broad range of fraudulent or deceptive 
schemes." State v. LeFevre. 825 P.2d 681, 687 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992) (citation omitted). In keeping with the goal of providing maximum protection to 
the public from fraudulent or deceptive schemes, the LeFevre Court adopted a "materiality" 
test for the element of reliance: 
The deceit must be "material" to constitute the offense, in the same sense that it 
must be a significant factor in the transaction. . . . Materiality seems to require 
that the victim to some extent must believe the pretense to be true, but the 
greater focus is the objective issue of whether the misrepresentation was 
instrumental in effecting the transfer of [property]. 
LeFevre. 825 P.2d at 687 (quoting State v. Schneider. 715 P.2d 297, 300 (Ariz. App. 1986). 
This Court went onto explain that the misrepresentation need not be the only, or even 
the controlling, factor in the victim's decision to transfer money or property. I i . Rather, 
sufficient reliance is established "if the victim believed the misrepresentation to be true, and 
included it as a factor in the decision-making process." 1&. 
Under the materiality test for reliance adopted in LeFevre. defendant's claim that the 
victims could not have "actually relied" on his misrepresentations as a matter of law is without 
merit. It is true that the victims all recognized that defendant and his wife could not be 
compelled to allow them to adopt defendant's child simply by their making a "charitable 
contribution" to defendant and his wife as permitted under section 76-7-203. Defendant is 
therefore correct when he suggests that "the [funds] at issue [were] given to the birth mother 
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[and defendant] as a charitable contribution, and not as consideration for her promised 
performance to consent to the adoption." Br. of Def. at 22. The problem with defendant's 
argument, however, is that it answers the wrong question. 
The issue to be resolved in this case was whether the victims relied on defendant's false 
representation that he and his wife intended to place their baby up for adoption. Having made 
that false representation, defendant then solicited funds from the adoptive couples, funds that 
defendant said were needed because he and the birth mother were facing an eviction from their 
apartment during the cold of winter. Defendant's solicitation was calculated to play upon the 
victims' concern for the birth mother's health and well-being, and hence that of her unborn 
child. Accordingly, the question to be answered under the materiality test for reliance is: 
Did the victims believe defendant's misrepresentation that he and his wife 
intended to allow the victims to adopt their baby, and did the victims include 
that misrepresentation as a factor in deciding whether to give money to 
defendant and his wife in keeping with the terms of section 76-7-203? 
The evidence adduced at trial clearly established that none of the victims would have 
given money to defendant had they known defendant and is wife did not really intend to allow 
them to adopt their baby. Nor would any of the victims have given money to defendant had 
they known that defendant and his wife were soliciting and receiving funds from other couples. 
This evidence was sufficient for the jury to have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the victims actually relied upon defendant's misrepresentations as a factor in deciding whether 
to give money to defendant and his wife. Indeed, it appears that this evidence not only 
satisfies the materiality test for establishing actual reliance, but in fact establishes that "but 
for" defendant's misrepresentations, the victims never would have parted with their money. 
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Cf LeFevre. 825 P.2d at 687 n.ll (noting that no Utah case has expressly required the State to 
prove "but for" reliance on the part of a victim but indicating the existence of "but for" 
reliance provides conclusive evidence of reliance element). Defendant's claim that actual 
reliance could not have been established in this case as a matter of law should therefore be 
rejected because it is predicated on a misapprehension of what constitutes reliance and ignores 
the evidence presented by the State. 
Defendant's proposed construction of sections 76-7-203 and 76-6-405 is not only 
legally flawed, it would also make for bad public policy. Suppose, for instance, a husband 
and his wife, knowing that the wife is not pregnant, nevertheless convince an adoptive couple 
that she is pregnant, that they intend to allow the couple to adopt their baby, and on that basis 
the husband solicits and accepts "charity" from the would be adoptive parents pursuant to 
section 76-7-203. Under defendant's proposed rule of law, neither the woman nor her 
husband could be convicted of theft by deception because the adoptive couple could not have 
relied on the "promised performance to consent to the adoption" given that no person can be 
compelled or induced to place their child for adoption based on contributions made under 
section 76-7-203. Br. of Def. at 22. 
A rule of law that would result in such injustice runs contrary to the intent of theft by 
deception statutes, which is to protect the public "from a broad range of fraudulent or 
deceptive schemes." LeFevre. 825 P.2d 687. The primary difference between the above 
hypothetical and the instant case is that defendant's wife was in fact pregnant. The fact 
remains, as evidenced by the jury's verdict, that defendant falsely represented that he and his 
wife intended to place their child up for adoption. What makes this case especially egregious, 
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however, is that defendant defrauded not just one, not two, but in fact three different adoptive 
couples. Indeed, defendant continued to perpetrate his fraud even after his baby was born by 
accepting funds from the Elizondos and soliciting and accepting funds from the Hallidays 
while leading them to believe the baby had yet to be born. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court properly rejected defendant's legal arguments 
and instructed the jury about the relationship between section 76-7-203 and the crime of theft 
by deception in Jury Instruction 28: 
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation may pay maternity 
expenses, related medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of the 
mother preceding and during confinement. However, that act of paying is by 
law considered an act of charity and may not be made for the purpose of 
inducing the mother, parent, or legal guardian to place the child for adoption, 
consent to an adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or her child is a 
personal and private act of that person and may not be bought or bartered for 
under the law. A natural parent at any time may choose not to consent to an 
adoption. By so choosing, that person does not subject himself or herself to 
criminal responsibility unless you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense of Theft by Deception, 
as charged in the Informations!,] have been established. 
(R. 386). (A copy of Jury Instruction 28 is attached hereto as addendum B.) 
The propriety of a particular jury instructions is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992). In deciding whether 
the challenged instruction was proper, Utah appellate courts review the jury instruction "in 
their entirety and will affirm when the jury instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury 
on the law applicable to the case." liL (citation omitted). 
Defendant argues that instruction 28 constitutes a misstatement of the law because it 
"purports to carve out a theft by deception exception from the statute which mandates that all 
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monies given to birth mothers are charitable contributions." Br. of Def. at 21. Defendant 
preserved this argument for appeal (R. 1170-71). At trial, however, defendant also objected to 
the trial court's refusal to give a similar instruction that was submitted by co-defendant Tonya 
Vigil (R. 1165, 1169). Specifically, counsel for Ms. Vigil requested that the following 
instruction be given: 
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation may pay maternity 
expenses, related medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of the 
mother preceding and during confinement. However, that act of paying is by 
law considered an act of charity and may not be made for the purpose of 
inducing the mother, parent, or legal guardian to place the child for adoption, 
consent to an adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or her child is a 
personal and private act of that person and may not be bought or bartered for 
under the law. A natural parent at any time may choose not to consent to an 
adoption. By so choosing, that person does not subject himself or herself to 
criminal responsibility unless you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person never had the intention of consenting to the 
adoption of the child. 
R. 332. (A copy of defendant's proposed jury instruction 10 is attached hereto as addendum 
C.) 
The only difference between Jury Instruction 28 and the instruction requested by 
defendant is in the last sentence. Rather than limiting the possible grounds for finding theft by 
deception to situations in which a birth parent "never had the intention of consenting to the 
adoption of the child,* the trial court instructed the jury that criminal responsibility would 
only be proven if the jury were to "find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each 
and every element of the offense of Theft by Deception, as charged in the Informations!,] 
ha[d] been established.n 
Counsel for defendant's wife objected to the court's "modified* version of his 
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proposed instruction number 10 because he ttbelieve[d] that [his] proposed [instruction] No. 10 
without modification [wa]s a more correct statement of the law and also reflect[ed his] position 
in terms of the status of the law regarding theft by deception as it relate[d] to adoption 
proceedings" (R. 1165). Defendant's trial counsel expressly joined that objection (R. 1169). 
Defendant also objected instruction 28 as given, claiming that its last sentence was improper 
because "it suggests that choosing not to place a child for adoption, having received a 
charitable contribution from a party who wishes to adopt, is a crime. It is not and it renders 
this instruction incorrect and actually internally inconsistent. It is a contradictory statement in 
the instruction itself (R. 1170-71). 
Properly viewed, defendant's objection to Jury Instruction 28 essentially amounts to a 
claim that the unmodified instruction 10 as proposed by the defense was a more accurate 
statement of the law. Defendant is mistaken. In the first place, defendant's proposed 
instruction constituted an incorrect statement of the law because it suggested theft by deception 
could be established only if the birth parent "never had the intention of consenting to the 
adoption of the child." In a prosecution for theft by deception, however, the intent of the 
defendant at the time of taking the victim's money is determinative. £££ State v. Droddy. 702 
P.2d 111 (Utah 1985) (fact that defendant later entered an agreement with victim, appearing to 
negate any criminal intent, is immaterial because intent at time of taking is determinative). 
Accordingly, instruction 28 as originally proposed by the defense misstated the law insofar as 
it implied theft by deception did not occur so long as defendant and his wife at some point in 
time intended to consent to the adoption. The problem with that scenario lies in the fact that, 
even assuming defendant and his wife originally intended to complete the adoption, if they 
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later changed their minds but defendant continued to tell the victims they intended to complete 
the adoption while soliciting and accepting additional money from them, then defendant would 
properly be convicted of theft by deception. Moreover, even assuming defendant and his wife 
at one time intended to place their child with one of the three couples who were victimized, 
defendant told all three couples during the same time period that he and his wife intended to 
allow each couple to adopt his baby, and he solicited and accepted money from all three 
couples on that basis. Defendant therefore had to have intentionally deceived at least two of 
the three adoptive couples. 
The trial court likely recognized that defendant's proposed jury instruction was flawed 
and modified the instruction so that it would constitute a full and accurate statement of the law. 
The result of that effort was instruction 28. Defendant then argued, contrary to his position 
with respect to his proposed instruction 10, that theft by deception could never occur in an 
adoption proceeding and that instruction 28 was therefore a misstatement of the law because it 
purported to create a non-existent "exception" to section 77-6-203 (R. 1170-71). 
According to defendant, no "exception" exists because the element of reliance will 
necessarily be lacking in any case involving a failed adoption because the adoptive parents will 
always know that the birth parents remain free to change their minds even if they accept 
money from the adoptive parents. As demonstrated above, that claim is predicated upon a 
misapprehension of the reliance element. 
Because Instruction 28 was an accurate statement of the law, defendant's challenge to it 
in Point II of his brief should be rejected. Defendant's related argument in Point V of his 
brief that "charitable contributions cannot be the object of theft by deception," Br. of Def. at 
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38, should likewise be rejected. As the trial court properly noted, "the fact that [the property 
transferred from the victims to defendant] is characterized as a charitable contribution [under 
section 76-7-203] does not mean that that property cannot be the object of theft by deception" 
(R. 1053). See, fi^f Commonwealth vT Atwppd, 601 A.2d 277, 287 (Pa. Super, 1991), 
appeal denied, 607 A.2d 249 (Penn. 1992) (where minister falsely told victim he would use 
money she loaned him to purchase air time from television station to broadcast his ministry 
and victim later indicated she would consider the loan a gift so long as the money was used for 
the Lord's work, minister's conviction still upheld because evidence supported determination 
that he obtained the funds through deception regardless of whether the transaction was deemed 
a loan or a gift). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED TESTIMONY ABOUT 
HOW ADOPTIONS ARE PROCESSED BY LICENSED AGENCIES 
BECAUSE THAT EVIDENCE WAS BOTH IRRELEVANT AND LIKELY 
TO CONFUSE THE JURY 
The trial court properly excluded the testimony of defense witness Roland Oliver 
because his testimony about how adoption agencies operate had no bearing on the question of 
whether defendant intentionally deceived three adoptive couples when he falsely told all three 
couples during the same period of time that he and his wife intended to allow them to adopt 
defendant's baby. Oliver's testimony was therefore irrelevant under rule 402, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Even if Oliver's testimony had been relevant, the trial court's additional 
determination that Oliver's testimony was likely to confuse or mislead the jury was reasonable 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court's exclusion of Oliver's testimony 
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should therefore be upheld. 
A. Oliver's Testimony Was Irrelevant. 
The term "relevant evidence" is defined in Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Although evidence that is relevant is generally admissible, evidence that is not relevant 
is inadmissible. Utah R. Evid. 402. A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether 
proffered evidence is relevant, and Utah appellate courts will find error in a relevancy ruling 
only if the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that the 
term "abuse of discretion" is not capable of precise definition, State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
937 (Utah 1994). Rather, "a spectrum of discretion exists . . . [and] toward the broad end of 
the spectrum is the decision to admit or exclude evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 403." 
I$L at 938. Although not as close to the broad end of the spectrum as a rule 403 
determination, a trial court's relevancy ruling under rule 402 should likewise be accorded 
broad discretion. Here, the trial court properly excluded defendant's proffered evidence. 
Shortly after Roland Oliver began testifying on direct examination, the State objected to 
his testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant (R. 1154). The trial court initially sustained 
the State's objection, but then called a recess and heard arguments about the relevancy of 
Oliver's testimony outside the presence of the jury (R. 1154-58). The whole of that discussion 
went as follows: 
THE COURT: You may be seated. The jury is not present at this time and now 
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I will hear your relevancy argument, Mr. Scowcroft. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, Your Honor, the state in this case is alleging that the 
defendants deliberately defrauded adoption attorneys. What we 
will argue to the jury is that there was no deliberate attempt to 
defraud anyone and that misunderstandings occurred as a result 
of conduct of the attorneys. And we believe that information 
regarding — There has been testimony about adoption agencies in 
this trial. Why people sought a private attorney as opposed to an 
adoption agency. We believe that some of the problems that 
occurred here that are being alleged as fraud by the state, would 
not have occurred in a different context and so we feel that this 
information is relevant to our defense. 
THE COURT: Would not have occurred in a different context? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Correct. 
THE COURT: Also, give me just a brief proffer of what you expect this witness 
to testify to so we can have that on the record. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: This witness will testify, I believe, that adoption agencies, 
because they are certified by the state and required to do these 
things, perform certain services to adopting parents and to 
mothers who wish to place their children for adoption. We feel 
that had some of these procedures existed in this case, that the 
problems that occurred here would not have happened. 
THE COURT: And that is a summary of what this witness would testify to? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, that is part of what this witness would testify to, I believe. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones. 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I just don't see the relevance. [Mr. Oliver] has no 
knowledge about this particular case. He wasn't involved. We 
have a fact situation where the defendants contact three attorneys. 
They don't go through an adoption agency. We are not here to 
decide what should be the proper procedure. We are here to 
decide whether or not the defendants are guilty of theft by 
deception. And frankly, I just don't see where Mr. Oliver's 
testimony has anything to add as far as what happened. 
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MR. SCOWCROFT: This is an expert witness. His testimony is relevant to this case 
because it is going to help the jury understand the context in 
which these alleged acts occurred. 
Mr. Halliday and Mr. Elizondo testified that they had some 
experience with adoption agencies, but for their own reasons 
chose to go through a private attorney. So clearly there is 
evidence that adoption agencies were at some time contacted. 
And part of our defense is that there were no — that there were 
misunderstandings. There were problems. These resulted from 
what might be characterized as either misconduct by some of the 
attorneys or a failure to provide services that would have 
prevented these problems from ever occurring. That is it. 
THE COURT: Let me say, the Court is going to sustain the state's objection to 
this witness's testimony under Rule 402. The Court does not 
believe that this evidence is relevant. 
Furthermore, as a further basis for excluding the testimony, 
under Rule 403 this Court is satisfied that this testimony, even if 
it were deemed to be relevant, which this Court does not so find, 
that this type of evidence in light of the nature of this case, would 
have a tendency to mislead the jury, confuse the jury. 
So under 402 and 403,1 am sustaining the state's objection and 
precluding this witness from testifying. . . . 
R. 1155-58. 
From defendant's proffer and the arguments he made at trial, it appears defendant had 
two theories that he believed demonstrated Oliver's testimony was relevant. First, defendant 
claimed Oliver's testimony would "help the jury understand the context in which these alleged 
acts occurred" (R 1157). Second, defendant implicitly argued Oliver's testimony was relevant 
because it would have shown that had procedures akin to those employed by adoption agencies 
been in place he would known that his conduct was improper (R. 1156-57). Accordingly, 
defendant argues Oliver's testimony was relevant because it would have helped show 
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defendant did not act with "the intent to deceive anyone or to wrongfully deprive [the victims] 
of their property." Br. of Def. at 27. Instead, defendant claims his acts "resulted from what 
might be characterized as either misconduct by [attorneys Giffen and Bushman] or a failure [on 
the part of attorneys Giffen, Bushman and Fineshriber] to provide services that would have 
prevented these problems from ever occurring" (R. 1157). Neither theory is persuasive. 
Under defendant's first relevancy argument, Oliver's testimony was properly excluded 
because it would have - at best- amounted to speculation about how defendant might have 
acted under other circumstances. Defendant proffered only that Oliver would testify about the 
services that adoption agencies offer. Not only was no adoption agency involved in 
defendant's case, but Oliver had no knowledge of defendant's case and was not involved in the 
adoption proceedings at issue. Given defendant's proffer and Oliver's lack of knowledge about 
defendant's case, it is difficult to see how Oliver's testimony "[wa]s going to help the jury 
understand the context in which these alleged acts occurred" (R. 1157 ). Indeed, defendant's 
trial counsel argued that Oliver's testimony would help establish that defendant's misconduct 
"would not have occurred in a different setting" — i.e., the setting of an agency adoption (R. 
1155) (emphasis added). What may or may not have happened in the hypothetical setting of 
an agency adoption was irrelevant to what in fact happened in the "setting" of defendant's 
case. Defendant's first relevancy argument was therefore flawed on its face, and the trial 
court properly refused to admit Oliver's testimony under that theory because it invited 
speculation on an issue unrelated to defendant's case. 
Defendant's second ground for asserting that Oliver's testimony was relevant is that it 
would have helped prove that he did not act intentionally. Specifically, defendant appears to 
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believe that Oliver's testimony was relevant because he would have helped establish that 
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within its discretion when it excluded Oliver's testimony as irrelevant under rule 402. 
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B. Even Assuming Oliver's Testimony Were Deemed Relevant. The Trial 
Court Properly Excluded It Under Rule 403. 
A trial court's ruling regarding admissibility of evidence under rule 403 will not be 
reversed on appeal absent on abuse of discretion. State v. White. 880 P.2d 18, 20, (Utah 
App. 1994). The term "abuse of discretion" is not capable of precise definition. Pena. 869 at 
937. Rather, "a spectrum of discretion exists . . . [and] toward the broad end of the spectrum 
is the decision to admit or exclude evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 403." LL at 938. 
In keeping with Pena. this Court recently reiterated that a trial court's rule 403 determination 
should not be reversed unless the ruling "was beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 
Lindgren. No. 950271-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah App. January 25, 1996) (citing State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)). In this case, the trial court's determination 
that Oliver's testimony was inadmissible under rule 403 because it would mislead or confuse 
the jury was reasonable. 
Rule 403 provides that, although relevant, evidence may be excluded "if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
consideration of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. Here, the trial court's 403 ruling 
was based on its concern that Oliver's testimony would conftise or mislead the jury (R. 1157-
58). In light of defendant's proffer of Oliver's testimony and the nature of the case, the trial 
court's ruling was not beyond the bounds of reason. 
On its face, defendant's asserted basis for admitting Oliver's testimony was a request 
for permission to encourage the jury to evaluate defendant's conduct based on how defendant 
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might have behaved in a different, hypothetical situation. Oliver's testimony therefore created 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON THE UTAH CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BECAUSE THE 
QUESTION OF WHETHER ANY OF THE ATTORNEYS DEFENDANT 
SPOKE WITH VIOLATED PROVISIONS OF THAT CODE WAS 
IRRELEVANT 
The trial court properly refused to give defendant's requested jury instructions that 
qui mi I portion1.' Il n Ii I " in I I II I I'll ill i I'nl Professional Conduct, Although defendants 
have the right to have tfaeii 'theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
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understandable way," 
State v. Potter. 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981), "instructions generally ought to be drafted 
with a view to assisting the jury to understand the issues they have to decide." State v. 
Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988). In sum, a[t]he trial court has a duty to instruct 
the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case." Potter. 672 P.2d at 78. 
A trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). Here, 
defendant complains that the trail court erred when it refused to give the following instructions 
to the jury: 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that 
client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not 
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that 
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client 
or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected; and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, 
the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of 
the common representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
(R. 295). 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or 
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
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Defendant's proposed instructions would not have assisted the jury in determining 
whether defendant's purported dissatisfaction with Giffen and Bushman was genuine. Nor 
would they have assisted the jury in determining whether defendant and his wife in fact 
intended to place their baby for adoption up until they became dissatisfied with Giffen and 
Bushman. Those were factual issues that jury had to decide based on the evidence presented. 
Consideration of the separate question of whether the conduct of Giffen or Bushman was 
violative of rules 1.7 and 1.8 would not have assisted the jury in deciding those questions. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to give defendant's proposed instructions 8 and 9. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT TRIAL COUNSEL 
PERFORMED INEFFECTIVELY BY NOT REQUESTING A 
PARTICULAR JURY INSTRUCTION OR THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY NOT GIVING THE INSTRUCTION 
SUA SPONTE 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to request a 
jury instruction outlining the codified defenses to a charge of theft and, alternatively, that the 
trial court committed plain error by failing to give such an instruction even absent a request 
from counsel. Br. of Def. at 34-5. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402, in pertinent part, provides as 
follows: 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or 
service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to 
obtain or exercise control over the property or service as he did; 
or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or 
service honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
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/ 1 w h a t his counsel's performance was deficient in llul n» " iw I i* > nii^cih-c MJiitl^mi i I 
• -, mablenes" and (21 that, but for counsel's deficient pu»w**A , —- nlant wou* e 
-. iore favorable outcome at tria! Se£, £ £ , State v. Cummins. 83V * — - * .< 
In I ' iii i ( dcmonstr?- tiiat the 
alleged ei i 01 should have 'been -^ to the trial court and that State v. 
Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). T «.,*. „~«nt cannot den under either test 
because a n viif v it! ill i nnl indicates that umi wuuosel had a clear defense' 'theory 'that he 
may hav* is impact if he also argued a defense theory based on section 
76 ~6 402(3). 
At trial, defendant's theory of the case was 'that defendant and his wife nevei 
ntionally deceived any of the victims because they I! I iiriii lai.i in tend to p l a c e then lutbv 
"* *
!
- - -—ed them to change their 
. defendant argin his wife never actually 
changed their mind about allowing then, u~.
 t . „,. a 
^uld not work with 'the Elizondos' attorney, Mm Giffen. That conflict is w hat, 
' *s argument at trial, prompted them to meet with Bushman and 
ri noil in ii<io|iih<< IHIIIIIV t i l l l iuiipli iiuliiilly 11«s11111v vulli 
Bushman because he said he wanted to adopt their baby, defendant's wife testified that it was 
Bushman who changed his mind about adopting their baby. Finally, defendantJs wik testilitil, 
I iffrmtTFi flrpn^i, thai ffif 1'iiily reason why they did not place their baby with the 
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Hallidays was because they realized only after the baby had been born that they loved her too 
much to place her with another family. 
Plainly, defendant's theory at trial was that he never knowingly or intentionally 
deceived any of the victims when he told them that he was going to consent to the adoption. 
Defense counsel could reasonably have concluded that it was better to argue that one, straight 
forward defense than it would have been to argue a second defense along the lines envisioned 
under section 76-6-402(3). For instance, counsel may have determined that an argument under 
section 76-6-402(3)(a) might confuse the jury by implying defendant was arguing that even if 
defendant did knowingly or intentionally deceive the victims he nonetheless was justified in 
believing he was acting "under an honest claim of right." Similarly, counsel may have feared 
that an argument under subsection b would have implied that defendant believed that ahe had 
the right to obtain or exercise control over the [victims'] property" even if he had to mislead 
the victims in order to get them to make a "charitable contribution" under section 76-7-203. 
Even if defendant had a viable defense argument under section 76-6-402(3), there was 
record support for counsel's argument that defendant never knowingly or intentionally 
deceived the victims and that the problems with the Elizondos and Bushmans stemmed from 
poor communication and frustrating interactions with the attorneys, while the agreement with 
the Hallidays failed simply because defendant and his wife honestly changed their mind about 
one of the most difficult decisions a person could make. Defense counsel's decision to 
advance a single defense argument instead of running the risk of confusing the jury about 
defendant's theory of the case by advancing more than one argument was not unreasonable. 
Cf. State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 1993) (even though defendant may have had 
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viable voluntary intoxication defense, court would not second guess trial touusdl'"'. Ml n not 
counsel presented defense that more closely comported to the GwAv**v*ttnt's 
stor\ ai tr; **e a. ^ ^ I is well established that counsel will ir* 1-~ 
eu melic ilinult mole.sjiiunal LIJUULL ui ilitiltpi , uni! not 
yield the desired outcome. 14, 
Similarly, the trial court could have reasonably deem Il Il llllli I it was u p to defense 
4 (1 ' i 1) W'ris of sufficient va lue to 
just ify the r isk that it mieh t detract fro* i t ' s c laim tha he did TKH knowing! ) -m 
in tent ional ly miskw w.. ... « .„ r . r 
section 76-6402(3), it does not necessarily follow that "the court erred in not instructing the 
ion on that precision abserf s reques* from defend"* T- "jm, while defendant has argued 
*i,o uiu, ^ - ^ ~ ^nu the court may have had ^ ieg _ ' *r not p su ng ma; :nc ^ 
argument in light of the defenses lead argument. 
^ * -•• -~ -
J
- ndant has made no attempt to establish that --
of the evidence - there is a reasonable likelihood that he would have 
obtained a _. . .. K I HI I nihil HI in I IIIIIII "i.n linn 'd fi 111 M I) 
Rather, he baldy assei is that 'the alleged error was prejudicial. Br. of Def. at 36. In light of 
the fact that the evidence showed defendant told three different couples during the same period 
on the basis, it is difficult to see how an instruction based on section 76-6402(3) would have 
altered the outcome of defendant ' • • •-• I I J i il, Hn ) , ulu ( in'ftkntes its deiei miration 
49 
that defendant knowingly or intentionally deceived the victims. Because defendant had failed 
to prove that he would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial had it not been for the 
alleged errors of his counsel and the trial court, defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel and plain error on the part of Judge Medley should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should hold that no errors were 
committed during the course of defendant's trial and affirm defendant's convictions of theft by 
deception. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Given the factual and legal complexity of this case, the State respectfully asks that this 
Court set the matter for oral argument and issue a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi^Z^^iay of February, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
A 
TODD A. U T Z I > K 3 E ^ ^ ~ ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102. 
Date thist^-P day of February, 1996. 
TODDA.UTZINGE^ £) 
Assistant Attorney ueneral 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
"Illegality Pitfalls in Independent Adoptions" 
St. George, UT 84770 
(801) 628-4800 
6925 Union Pk. Ctr, Suite 300 
Midvale, UT 84047 
(801) 561-0103 801-533-0500 
1840 North State 
Provo, UT 84604 
(801) 375-9500 
5650 Sunrise Blvd. S ite 5A 
Citrus Heights, CA 1 MUm 
(916) 965-4017 
ILLEGALITY PITFALLS IN IN* EPENDENT ADOPTIONS 
The Following Act are Crimes: 
1 . Buying, selling, or at tempting to buy or sel any person to another 
or paying or receiving anything of value for having
 t pei son placed in the 
custody of another. Penal Code Section 181 
2. Paying a parent anything of value for the plac anient for . (option, for 
consent to adoption, or for cooperation in the completic i of an adoption of his 
or her child. Penal Code Section 27 3 fa) 
3. Obtaining benefits from prospective adoptive parents for the paynent 
of hospital or medical expense or financial benefits such as necessary li\ing 
expenses related to the pregnancy of the birth mother or the birth of a 
prospective adoptee with the intent to receive the benefits and not complete 
this adoption or consent to the adop ion. Penal Code Section 27 3 (b) (Note: 
Penal Code Section 27 3 permits the payment of maternity connected medical or 
hospital a d necessary living expenses as an act of charity). 
4. Advertising placement of children for adoption or publishing a 
solicitation of a child for adoption without holding a license or permit to 
place children for adoption. (Civil :ode Section 224 (\ \ 
5. Placing a child for adoption without holding a license or permit to 
do so (this prohibitior does not apply to the parent of a child placed for 
adoption) . Civil Code Lection 224 (a) 
6 . Intentional falsification of the accounting report made under penalty 
of perjury, which accounting report requires a full accounting of all 
disbursements of anything of value made by
 Lhe adoptive pc titioners in connection 
with the birth of the child, the placement of the chilli with petitioners, any 
medial or hospit.il care received by the natural mother of the child or by the 
child, in connection with it; birth, or any other expenses of either natural 
parent of the child, or the adoption. Civil Code Section 224 (r) 
7. Wrongfully concealing or removing th > prospective adoptee from the 
country in which the adoption is pending. Civil x/e Section 226.10* See also 
Penal Code Section 280. 
JLciuu LjffLcEiL of 
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& ASS QCIATES • ATTORNEYS AT LAW | 
ADDENDUM B 
Jury Instruction 28 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation may pay 
maternity expenses, related medical or hospital, and necessary 
living expenses of the mother preceding and during confinement. 
However, that act of paying is by law considered an act of charity 
and may not be made for the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, 
or legal guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an 
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or her child 
is a personal and private act of that person and may not be bought 
or bartered for under the law. A natural parent at any time may 
choose not to consent to an adoption. By so choosing, that person 
does not subject himself or herself to criminal responsibility 
unless you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt 
each and every element of the offense of Theft by Deception, as 
charged in the Informations have been established. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction 10 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
Under Utah law# any person, agency, or corporation may pay 
maternity expenses, related medical or hospital, and necessary 
living expenses of the mother preceding and during confinement. 
However, that act of paying is by law considered an act of charity 
and may not be made for the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, 
or legal guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an 
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or her child 
is a personal and private act of that person and may not be bought 
or bartered for under the law. A natural parent at any time may 
choose not to consent to an adoption. By so choosing, that person 
does not subject himself or herself to criminal responsibility 
unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the person never had 
the intention of consenting to the adoption of the child. 
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